Talks between Syria and Israel – the possibility of which has the media abuzz – make perfect sense. If you’re Bashar Assad, that is.
The latest notion is that, with the diplomatic process between Israel and the Palestinians at a standstill, Israel could use a breakthrough on the northeastern front. (By “Israel,” one might infer Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, whose approval rating has sunk to the single digits.) Syria, of course, desperately needs a break – from America, because Syria allows jihadists to file into Iraq through its border, and from the United Nations, because Syria is the only real suspect in the assassination of Lebanon’s former prime minister Rafik Hariri.
There’s a pretty convenient deal for everyone, right?
Well, if the idea were to talk about peace for peace, then it could definitely be a good thing. But everyone knows that Syria’s asking price for making peace with Israel is a full return of the Golan Heights, and that its offer in return is the mere promise to consider “nor
malization.”
Want to put such a deal in historical context? Here’s an analogy that springs to mind: Israel selling the Golan to Syria for a cold peace is the Middle East equivalent of the Boston Red Sox selling Babe Ruth to the New York Yankees.
The Golan provides Israel with vital water resources, a tourism goldmine, and militarily strategic high ground. It is enormously popular with Israelis – far more so than the Gaza Strip, which the country gave up two years ago with no small amount of heartache. Yet Syria wants it back.
What is it, exactly, that supposedly makes the Golan Heights – which is home to numerous remains of the ancient Israelites – a Syrian territory? Israel has already ruled the Golan for twice as long as Syria. (Syria gained its independence from France in 1944, so it only held the Golan for 23 years. Before the French mandate, the Ottoman Turks controlled the territory for 400 years. Before them, the Mamluks had it for two and a half centuries.) And while Syria was in charge, it did little with the territory other than use it as a launching ground for mortar fire on Israeli farms and for Palestinian fedayeen to carry out cross-border raids into Israel.
Olmert’s administration may be more interested in giving the appearance of willingness to talk with Assad, and not actually be interested in talking with him. A parallel situation is likely the case where Assad is concerned. But it is strange that Israel would even fly this trial balloon right now. Wouldn’t it benefit more by letting Assad twist in the wind while the UN’s Hariri tribunal starts presenting its evidence against him and his intelligence agents?
Maybe that’s why US Secretary of State Condolleeza Rice put the kibosh last week on Israeli reports of interest in talks with Syria. Of course, she did so just after meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem, and while the State Department was trying to set up the first high-level talks between America and Iran in 30 years. Not exactly a consistent line of reasoning there.
(Speaking of that,
this report on last week's meeting between the foreign ministers of Iran and Syria is good for a chuckle. Oh, sure, they both want to see Iraq and Lebanon stabilized!)
America, at least, has an urgent need to stop the bleeding in Iraq. Apparently, it is willing to lose a little face to Damascus and Tehran in the (futile) hopes of getting some cooperation there.
What about Israel, though? Does it really need to stave off a Syrian attack? The argument is that, if Israel doesn’t agree to surrender the Golan via diplomacy, Syria will be forced to demand it through war. To clarify that point, a Syrian MP has said that the armed forces are preparing for war with the Zionists.
The fact is, though, that Israel has enjoyed a pretty cushy state of war with Syria ever since 1973. The vastness of the qualitative gap between Israel’s military and Syria’s has been proven time and again since then, and it is not about to be bridged any time soon. So you have to ask yourself why Syria has not tried a direct assault on Israel in 34 years. Is it because it thought that a diplomatic breakthrough was right around the corner, or because it feared such a confrontation?
Olmert and Assad talking about that – now
that would be interesting.