Fatah gives up the ghost in Gaza

Well, that was fast.

Hamas has taken over the Gaza Strip in what can only be called a military coup. The gunmen did a pretty good job of planning and carrying out a lightning operation… in fact, they succeeded so much that an entire clan of Fatah supporters, with a few hundred men under arms, surrendered rather than face a fight. Those Fatah gunmen who haven’t turned themselves over, been kidnapped or killed, are fleeing to Egypt by the dozens.

In trying to understand how this happened, some will undoubtedly lay the blame on Israel for failing to support Mahmoud Abbas and those parts of the Palestinian Authority security services that are under the control of his Fatah Party. And, they’ll say, Israel should have helped Fatah fend off Hamas.

The fact is, though, that Israel did just about all it could.

Israel took the diplomatic initiative to marginalize and weaken Hamas politically by inducing the imposition of an international embargo on their government ministers. Fatah could have used that to tell the Palestinian public that only it (Fatah) would be able to deliver diplomatic achievements. Yet it squandered that opportunity by identifying with Hamas and reinforcing its martyr’s image.

Israel has funneled or facilitated the delivery of funds and weapons to Abbas, to help him maintain an advantage over Hamas. This too he has squandered. (It should be noted that Fatah folded this week despite enjoying a numerical advantage over Hamas.)

Most dramatically, though, Israel has fought Fatah's battles for it -- by overwhelmingly focusing on Hamas activists in its military operations. The data are unequivocal: in its arrest raids and in its assassinations of senior and mid-level activists, the Israeli army has disproportionately targeted Hamas. In the years 2000 through 2004, for example, 80% of Israeli air strikes were carried out against Hamas figures. Since then, the trend has only continued, and even increased. In addition, Israel has carried out assassinations and “interceptions” of Hamas men almost exclusively in the Gaza Strip for the past three or four years.

You would think, then, that Hamas would have grown weaker vis-à-vis Fatah in Gaza, instead of stronger.

How ironic it is that Yasser Arafat used to say that he couldn’t control the “rogue” Hamas. Well, it came true in the end.

Why did Hamas’s political and military might grow? It grew, not only because Hamas took the initiative to grow and challenge Fatah, but because Fatah did not respond to that challenge. The plain truth, it must be said, is that Fatah committed suicide. It took a few years, sure, but it was suicide just the same. In Gaza at least, Fatah has given up the ghost.